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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for drug-related violence (mexico)
7 results foundAuthor: Molzahn, Cory Title: Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2012 Summary: The year 2012 marked the end of the six-year term of President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012), who was both lauded for his administration's unprecedented assault on organized crime groups and criticized for the loss of human life that accompanied this fight. From the beginning of his presidency, President Calderon made security a primary focus of his administration by doubling national security budgets and deploying tens of thousands of federal forces to the states most impacted by violence among drug trafficking organizations. However, under President Calderon, the number of overall homicides annually increased more than two and a half times from 10,452 in 2006 to 27,213 in 2011, according to figures from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia, INEGI). During the first five full years of Calderon's term - from 2007 through 2011 - INEGI reported 95,646 people killed, an average of 19,129 per year, or more than 50 people per day. By these measures, there was a 24% average annual increase in overall homicides during the Calderon administration. Calculating that overall homicides appear to have dropped by roughly 5-10% in 2012, our estimate is that the total number of homicides during the Calderon administration was likely around 120,000 to 125,000 people killed, depending on whether INEGI or the National System of Public Security (Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Publica, SNSP) data are used. In July 2012, Mexico elected a new president, Enrique Pena Nieto, who took office on December 1, restoring to power the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI), which governed Mexico without interruption for over seven decades until it lost the presidency in 2000. For better security coordination among government agencies, President Pena Nieto has instructed the Interior Ministry (Secretaria de Gobernacion, SEGOB) to oversee the creation of a new network, the System of Coordination and Cooperation (Sistema de Coordinacion y Cooperacion). In January 2012, Pena Nieto gave a clear message regarding the direction that his presidency will follow on security policy when he unveiled the "Pact for Mexico" (Pacto por Mexico), an agreement signed along with representatives from Mexico's major political parties. The Pacts 34-page itemized list of policies and reform's set forth proposals in several areas related to security and justice issues, particularly focusing on reducing homicides, kidnapping, and extortion. The Pact outlined steps to establish a 10,000-person National Gendarmerie and a unified police command system at the state-level. Above all, from the outset of his term, Pena Nieto declared that his security strategy would abandon the Calderon administration's heavy dependence on military deployments and its focus on dismantling organized crime groups. This information is part of Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis through 2012, the fourth of a series of reports that the Trans-Border Institute's Justice in Mexico Project has put together each year since 2010 to compile the latest available data and analysis to evaluate these challenges. Details: San Diego, CA: Trans-Border Institute, Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego, 2013. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2013 at: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/130206-dvm-2013-final.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/130206-dvm-2013-final.pdf Shelf Number: 127699 Keywords: Drug-Related Violence (Mexico)Drugs and CrimeHomicidesOrganized CrimeViolent Crime |
Author: Wittens, Stefan Title: Drug Related Violence in Mexico: A literature study from 1985-2011 Summary: The explanations for the escalation of drug-related violence that are found in the literature are diverse as well as numerous. Among these explanations two direct causations dominate: first, Mexican government policy and strategy, primarily since Calderon took office in 2006 and to lesser extent during the Fox administration and second, the competition between and within the Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) since 2000. However, when these explanations are compared to the empirical data, the escalation of violence primarily coincides with the policy of Calderon and there are no elevated levels of violence since 2000, which reduces the validity of inter and intra-cartel violence within the timeframe of the literature. The empirical data suggests that since 2004 drug-related violence started rising slightly, with a clear break and an escalation of homicides since 2007. This also adds more weight to two more explanations: first the diversification of DTO modus operandi, a process that has essentially started with the arrival of the Zetas and second, with a decline in demand for Mexican drugs in America since 2006. Furthermore, the findings from the literature study seem best explained by the principle of producer-product, as the direct causality between policy, competition and drug-related violence could hardly exist without the existing environment. Pre-conditions like weak institutional capacity, corruption, availability of weapons, poverty, geography, culture and others are seen as exacerbates and contributors to the escalating levels of drug-related violence. Details: Utrecht: Utrecht University, 2012. 105p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/student-theses/2012-1126-200608/UUindex.html Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/student-theses/2012-1126-200608/UUindex.html Shelf Number: 128891 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related Violence (Mexico)HomicidesOrganized CrimeZetas |
Author: Edmonds-Poli, Emily Title: The Effects of Drug-War Related Violence on Mexico’s Press and Democracy Summary: This working paper is the product of a joint project on civic engagement and public security in Mexico coordinated by the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Trans-Border Institute at the University of San Diego. The paper offers an assessment of the impact of criminal violence on journalists and media workers in Mexico, which is now the most dangerous country in the Western Hemisphere for journalists. Dr. Edmonds-Poli concludes with a set of policy recommendations for the Mexican government, Mexican society, and the international community to address the problem of violence against the Mexican media. The wide-ranging recommendations offer concrete steps that individuals and institutions involved may undertake to alleviate the violence, thereby ensuring freedom of expression and public access to information in Mexico, and, ultimately, strengthening Mexico’s democracy. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; San Diego, CA: Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego, 2013. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 7, 2013 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/edmonds_violence_press_0.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/edmonds_violence_press_0.pdf Shelf Number: 129002 Keywords: Drug Abuse and CrimeDrug TraffickingDrug-Related Violence (Mexico)HomicidesJournalistsMediaViolent Crime |
Author: Heinle, Kimberly Title: Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2013 Summary: Violence is lower in Mexico than elsewhere in the Americas, but average for the region. Levels of violence are relatively lower in Mexico than in several other countries in the Americas, but are about average for the Western Hemisphere. Mexico's 2011 homicide rate of 23.7 was slightly below the region's average of approximately 24.5 homicides per 100,000 people. However, this was up nearly threefold from Mexico's rate of 8.1 per 100,000 in 2007. No other country in the hemisphere has seen such a large increase in the number or rate of homicides over the last decade. Homicides had been declining through the mid-2000s, reaching a record low in 2007. Continuing a long-term trend, the number of intentional homicides documented by Mexico's National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Information (INEGI) declined significantly under both presidents Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) and Vicente Fox (2000-2006). Under Zedillo, the number of intentional homicides declined fairly steadily from 15,839 in 1994 to 10,737 in 2000, totaling 80,311 homicides. The annual number of homicides fluctuated somewhat under Fox, but continued to decline generally, with a total of 60,162 homicides. Moreover, the number of homicides actually reached a record low of 8,867 intentional homicides in 2007, the first full year in office for Felipe Calderon (2006-2012). Violence grew dramatically after 2008, with the number of homicides peaking in 2011. After Calderon's first year, the number of intentional homicides documented by INEGI climbed sharply, with year-over-year increases of more than 58% in 2008, 41% in 2009, 30% in 2010, and 5% in 2011. As predicted by last year's Justice in Mexico drug violence report, the number of intentional homicides documented by INEGI declined somewhat in 2012, Calderon's final year in office. Specifically, our March 2013 report predicted that INEGI would register a modest decline for 2012 (no greater than 8.5%). According to figures released in late-2013, the number of intentional homicides documented by INEGI for 2012 declined about 4% to 26,037. All told, throughout the Calderon administration, INEGI reported 121,669 homicides, an average of over 20,000 people per year, more than 55 people per day, or just over two people every hour. The total number of homicides appears to have declined by approximately 15% in 2013. While INEGI's figures are not available for 2013, preliminary data from Mexico's National Security System (SNSP) suggests that the total number of intentional homicides in 2013 declined again this year, and more than in 2012. However, some analysts are skeptical about SNSP's possible manipulation or withholding of data, so these findings should be viewed with caution. This said, at the time of this report, SNSP's tally of all intentional homicides in 2013 was 18,146, down 16.4% from about 21,700 in 2012. If the rate of decline is comparable for INEGI's tally, the total number of intentional homicides in 2012 INEGI will report for 2013 later this year will fall somewhere around 22,000 to 24,000 homicides. Mexico's recent violence is largely attributable to drug trafficking and organized crime. A large part of the sudden increase in violence in Mexico is attributable to drug trafficking and organized crime groups. Tallies compiled independently by media organizations in Mexico suggest that at least a third and as many as two-thirds of all intentional homicides in 2013 bore characteristics typical of organized-crime related killings, including the use of high-caliber automatic weapons, torture, dismemberment, and explicit messages involving organized crime groups. The Mexican newspaper Reforma put the figure at 7,163 organized-crime-style homicides in 2013 (though its coverage appeared to be less complete and less consistent with other sources than previous years), while Milenio reported 10,095 for the same year. Less violence in northern states has increased the spotlight on Pacific coastal states. In 2013, Mexico's violence - especially drug trafficking and organized-crime-style homicides - remained highly concentrated in specific regions, states, and municipalities. The elevated amounts and rates of violence were particularly concentrated in Mexico's Pacific coastal states, as violence in Northern states has diminished significantly. One exception in the north is Baja California, which saw a 31% increase in homicides, particularly as the city of Tijuana saw an increase in violence that ran counter to the significant declines elsewhere in the country. Community self-defense groups grew stronger in Guerrero, Michoacan, and other states. In 2012 and early 2013, public frustration with violence manifested itself in the form of armed community self-defense groups (autodefensas) in states like Guerrero and Michoacan. Particularly in Michoacan, where their presence has expanded into at least 29 of the state's 113 municipalities, such groups grabbed national and international headlines in early 2013 because of their direct clashes with the Knights Templar Organization (Caballeros Templarios, or KTO), a splinter organization that broke from the La Familia Michoacan (LFM) organization in 2010. There are concerns that self defense groups may have ties to organized crime groups and/or engage in acts of vigilante violence, and the Mexican government has tried to set parameters and restrictions on the use of firearms by such groups, so far with mixed results. President Pena Nieto continued to arrest major drug traffickers in 2013 and early 2014. On the campaign trail during 2012, Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto (2012-2018) had pledged to reduce the government's reliance on the counter-drug strategies employed by the Calderon administration. However, with just over one year in office, President Pena Nieto has continued the previous administration's policies, including a heavy reliance on the military and the targeted arrest of major organized crime figures. This paid off in a number of important successes, including the arrest of Miguel Angel "Z-40" Trevino (head of Los Zetas) and Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman (head of the Sinaloa Cartel). In March 2014, the Pena Nieto administration also announced that Mexican authorities had killed two top KTO leaders: Nazario Moreno Gonzalez, a.k.a. "El Chayo," who had been previously presumed dead, and Enrique "El Kike" Plancarte Solis. Recent organized crime arrests have not appeared to produce large spikes in violence. Some experts say that destroying leadership structures leads to greater violence because it contributes to infighting, splintering, and/or encroachment by rival criminal organizations. However, compared to previous years, the Mexican government's arrests of high-level members of organized crime groups have not resulted in such dramatic surges in violence due to infighting, splintering, or encroachment by rival criminal organizations. This may be attributable to a number of factors, including the dwindling size and capacity of criminal organizations in Mexico, the reduction in competition over drug production and trafficking routes, and/or the possible collusion of government officials to broker a peace. U.S.-Mexico security cooperation continues under the framework of the Merida Initiative. At the outset of the Pena Nieto administration, U.S. officials reportedly expressed concerns about the more centralized, "single window" (ventanilla unica) approach of Pena Nieto's administration to bi-national cooperation. However, while the protocols for such cooperation have changed, U.S.-Mexico cooperation has continued across all four "pillars" of the framework established under the Merida Initiative: 1) dismantling organized crime groups, 2) strengthening judicial sector institutions, 3) building a 21st century border, and 4) fostering resilient communities. Mexican security efforts appear more focused on prevention and criminal justice reform. While President Pena Nieto continued the same strategies of the previous administration during his first year in office, he also began to emphasize crime prevention and judicial system reform more strongly than in the past. Important initiatives in this regard include the creation of a new agency for crime prevention headed by Roberto Campa, as well as the introduction of a new, unified federal code of criminal procedure. The creation and training of a much-touted National Gendarmerie and a more unified police command system moved to the back burner but are still ongoing. Concerted implementation and evaluation efforts will be critical to the success of these initiatives. The drug war's future appears somewhat uncertain given changes in U.S. drug policy. Measures to legalize marijuana in 2013 in Uruguay and in two U.S. states - Colorado and Washington - have raised new questions about the future of the drug war. While public support for legalization of other drugs is very low, over half of the U.S. public now supports marijuana legalization. Legalization of marijuana will likely increase its availability and reduce its price, thereby reducing its profitability for the organized crime groups that currently produce, transport, and purvey it on the black market. While this will seriously diminish the capacity of organized crime groups in Mexico, it could also lead to innovation in their criminal activities to make up for lost revenue and other problems. Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico Project, University of San Diego, 2014. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 10, 2014 at: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/140415-dvm-2014-releasered1.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/140415-dvm-2014-releasered1.pdf Shelf Number: 147748 Keywords: Drug-Related Violence (Mexico)Drugs and CrimeHomicidesOrganized CrimeViolent Crime |
Author: Chi, Jocelyn Title: Reducing Drug Violence in Mexico: Options for Implementing Targeted Enforcement Summary: Between 2006 and 2012, drug-related violence in Mexico escalated to unprecedented levels. During this time, five of the top ten most violent cities in the world were found in Mexico, and over 60,000 Mexicans were killed at the hands of Violent Drug Trafficking Organizations (VDTOs). This reign of terror has expanded to include other types of violence, such as extortion, robbery, kidnapping, and spectacular public displays of violence. Most alarmingly, VDTO victims increasingly include ordinary citizens, journalists, law enforcement and military, and other government officials. To date, enforcement efforts in the United States (U.S.) have focused almost exclusively on reducing the flow of drugs from, and through, Mexico. Violence reduction has been a secondary concern, and has been mostly considered as a potential side-benefit of flow reduction policies. Until recently, Mexican authorities have focused their attacks on the upper leadership of major organized crime groups as a method of reducing flows, and in an effort to address threats to public safety. However, freshly elected President Enrique Pena Nieto has indicated that his administration will shift focus away from drug flows, in order to prioritize crime prevention and violence reduction. Given that both the Bush and Obama Administrations have acknowledged that the U.S. market for illegal drugs is largely responsible for fueling the Mexican drug trade, and that the U.S. has a strategic interest in Mexican security, the U.S. may have a currently-unexploited opportunity to reduce violence in Mexico. In this project, we explore whether the adoption of targeted enforcement in the Unites States could theoretically effect a reduction in violence in Mexico, and, if so, what form that strategy might take. We consider the operational and informational requirements for implementation, as well as the information a decision-maker would require in order to elect targeted enforcement as a strategy for addressing the security problem in Mexico. Targeted enforcement is novel in several respects. While it is not inconsistent with flow-reduction goals, the strategy leverages enforcement resources in the United States to effect violence reduction in Mexico. Furthermore, because it is a deterrent strategy, targeted enforcement requires authorities on both sides to clearly and publicly identify the target and communicate that violence will no longer be accepted as a method of conducting business. Finally, the target will encompass entire VDTOs, and not just individual offenders, which increases the cost of individual offending through internal organizational pressure. Keeping in mind current budgetary constraints, we develop four design options for violence-focused U.S.-side targeted enforcement. We evaluate our options with reference to the potential for crime and violence reduction, intelligence demands, implementation and political feasibility, and community impacts. Through a series of interviews with experts in the field, and an exhaustive review of secondary sources, we find that not only is U.S. adoption of targeted enforcement possible within existing frameworks, but that this approach has great potential for reducing Mexican-side violence. Our findings suggest: - First and foremost, we note that the adoption of a targeted violence-reduction approach need not conflict with current U.S. efforts to reduce drug flows; thus, there should be no cost in terms of drug abuse in the U.S. - While a short-term surge in violence is possible, attacking drug-trafficking revenues in the U.S. could incentivize VDTOs away from using violence to advance their drug-trafficking interests. Authorities would need to better understand the revenue portfolios of VDTOs in order to estimate how responsive organizations might be to attacks on revenues, and measure the cost-effectiveness of such a strategy. - Successful implementation requires sophisticated intelligence, and while there is some indication that both the U.S. and Mexico possess the capacity to gather this intelligence, this capacity would likely need to be refined and/or expanded. - The necessary administrative and enforcement infrastructures appear to be in place in the U.S., though resources would need to be reallocated, and additional funding might be necessary. - In the U.S., policies targeting drug flows are popular due to a perception that they decrease drug consumption; a shift towards violence reduction would probably require intensive outreach to educate stakeholders. In Mexico, current distrust in government would require clear and public communication about target selection and the role of Mexican authorities in U.S.-side enforcement. - Finally, a number of possible community impacts exist, and U.S. and Mexican authorities would need to establish mechanisms for collecting data and tracking trends in order to respond to negative externalities. Details: Los Angeles: UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs, 2013. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 25, 2014 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/reducing_drug_violence_mexico.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/reducing_drug_violence_mexico.pdf Shelf Number: 129923 Keywords: Criminal NetworksDrug MarketsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related Violence (Mexico)HomicidesKidnappingsOrganized CrimeTargeted Law EnforcementViolenceViolence PreventionViolence ReductionViolent Crime |
Author: Heinle, Kimberly Title: Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2014 Summary: - Violence is lower in Mexico than elsewhere in the Americas, but average for the region. Levels of violence are relatively lower in Mexico than in several other countries in the Americas, but are about average for the Western Hemisphere. Mexico's 2012 homicide rate of 21.5 was just above the region's average of approximately 21.4 homicides per 100,000 people. However, this was up nearly threefold from Mexico's rate of 8.1 per 100,000 in 2007. No other country in the hemisphere has seen such a large increase in the number or rate of homicides over the last decade. - Homicides had been declining through the mid-2000s, reaching a record low in 2007. Continuing a long-term trend, the number of intentional homicides documented by Mexico's National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Information (INEGI) declined significantly under both presidents Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) and Vicente Fox (2000-2006). Under Zedillo, the number of intentional homicides declined fairly steadily from 15,839 in 1994 to 10,737 in 2000, totaling 80,311 homicides. The annual number of homicides fluctuated somewhat under Fox, but continued to decline generally, with a total of 60,162 homicides. Moreover, the number of homicides actually reached a record low of 8,867 intentional homicides in 2007, the first full year in office for Felipe Calderon (2006-2012). - Violence grew dramatically after 2008, with the number of homicides peaking in 2011. After Calderon's first year, the number of intentional homicides documented by INEGI climbed sharply, with year-over-year increases of more than 58% in 2008, 41% in 2009, 30% in 2010, and 5% in 2011. As predicted by last year's Justice in Mexico drug violence report, the number of intentional homicides documented by INEGI declined somewhat in 2012, Calderon's final year in office. Specifically, our March 2013 report predicted that INEGI would register a modest decline for 2012 (no greater than 8.5%). According to figures released in late-2013, the number of intentional homicides documented by INEGI for 2012 declined about 4% to 26,037. All told, throughout the Calderon administration, INEGI reported 121,669 homicides, an average of over 20,000 people per year, more than 55 people per day, or just over two people every hour. - The total number of homicides appears to have declined by nearly 15% again in 2014. While INEGI's figures are not available for 2014, preliminary data from Mexico's National Security System (SNSP) suggests that the total number of intentional homicides in 2013 declined again this year by about the same proportion as in 2013. However, some analysts are skeptical about SNSP's data because of concerns about possible political manipulation by the Peea Nieto administration, so these findings should be viewed with caution. Keeping such concerns in mind, at the time of this report, SNSP's tally of all intentional homicides in 2014 was 15,649, down 13.8% from the 18,146 reported for 2013 the same time last year. The authors estimate a more modest rate of decline (about 9%) for INEGI's figures, to be released later in 2015. - Mexico's recent violence is largely attributable to drug trafficking and organized crime. A large part of the sudden increase in violence in Mexico is attributable to drug trafficking and organized crime groups. Tallies compiled independently by media organizations in Mexico suggest that at least a third and as many as half of all intentional homicides in 2014 bore characteristics typical of organized-crime related killings, including the use of high-caliber automatic weapons, torture, dismemberment, and explicit messages involving organized-crime groups. The Mexican newspaper Reforma put the figure at 6,400 organized-crime-style homicides in 2014 (though its coverage appeared to be less complete and less consistent with other sources than previous years), while Milenio reported 7,993 for the year. - Amid declining violence, serious security crises continued in central & Pacific states. Even amid the overall reduction in violence, there were serious security crises in central and Pacific states, notably the states of Guerrero, Mexico, and Michoacan. In early 2014, clashes broke out between the Knights Templar Organization (Caballeros Templarios, or KTO) and local "self-defense" (autodefensa) groups in Michoacan, causing the federal government to intervene and deputize some self-defense groups, creating official Rural Defense Forces. In late 2014, there were a series of violent crackdowns by authorities that resulted in the deaths of scores of people - including both alleged criminals and innocent civilians - in the states of Mexico and Guerrero, provoking national and international condemnations. In particular, when municipal authorities in the town of Iguala, Guerrero allegedly turned over dozens of student protestors to a local organized crime group known as the Guerreros Unidos, the perceived corruption and ineptitude of government officials led to massive protests and even acts of violence throughout the country. - The Mexican government arrested major drug traffickers, including "El Chapo" Guzman. Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto (2012-2018) has continued the previous administration's efforts to arrest major organized crime figures. In early 2014, the Pena Nieto administration succeeded in arresting Mexico's most notorious drug trafficker Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzman (head of the Sinaloa Cartel). In 2014, federal authorities also eliminated key leaders of the Knights Templar Organization, killing Nazario Moreno Gonzalez, a.k.a. "El Chayo" (who had been previously presumed dead) and Enrique "El Kike" Plancarte Solis. In early 2015, authorities continued to make important arrests targeting the Knights Templar Organization, the Gulf Cartel, the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, and the Zetas. - Recent organized crime arrests have not appeared to produce large spikes in violence. Some experts say that destroying leadership structures leads to greater violence because it contributes to infighting, splintering, and/or encroachment by rival criminal organizations. However, compared to previous years, the Mexican government's arrests of high-level members of organized crime groups have not resulted in such dramatic surges in violence due to infighting, splintering, or encroachment by rival criminal organizations. This may be attributable to a number of factors, including the dwindling size and capacity of criminal organizations in Mexico, the reduction in competition over drug production and trafficking routes, and/or the possible collusion of government officials to broker a peace. - Mexican security efforts appear more focused on prevention and criminal justice reform. While President Pena Nieto continued the same strategies of the previous administration during his first year in office, he also began to emphasize crime prevention and judicial system reform more strongly than in the past. Indeed, both the federal and state governments have moved into high gear in the effort to transition Mexico to a new oral, adversarial criminal procedure - popularly referred to as "oral trials" (juicios orales) - that proponents believe will provide greater transparency, efficiency, and fairness in the Mexican criminal justice system. In 2014, the Pena Nieto administration moved these efforts forward considerably by approving a Unified Code of Criminal Procedure that will be implemented at the federal and state levels throughout the country by June 2016. Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico Project, University of San Diego, 2015. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 23, 2015 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015-Drug-Violence-in-Mexico-final.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015-Drug-Violence-in-Mexico-final.pdf Shelf Number: 136142 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related Violence (Mexico) Drugs and Crime Homicides Organized Crime Violent Crime |
Author: Heinle, Kimberly Title: Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2016 Summary: This report examines trends in violence and organized crime in Mexico through 2016. Over the years, this series of Justice in Mexico special reports has compiled and attempted to reconcile often imperfect, confusing, and even conflicting information from both official and non-governmental sources regarding trends in violence and organized crime, and particularly "drug-related" violence. As the eighth annual report on Drug Violence in Mexico, this study compiles the latest available data and analysis of trends to help separate the signals from the noise to help better understand the facets, implications, and possible remedies to the ongoing crisis of violence, corruption, and human rights violations associated with the war on drugs. - Mexico has experienced dramatic increases in crime and violence in recent years. The number of intentional homicides documented by Mexico's National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Information (INEGI) declined significantly under both presidents Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) and Vicente Fox (2000-2006), but rose dramatically a year after President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) took office. All told, throughout the Calderon administration, INEGI reported 121,669 homicides, an average of over 20,000 people per year, more than 55 people per day, or just over two people every hour. No other country in the Western Hemisphere saw such a large increase either in its homicide rate or in the absolute number of homicides over the last two decades. - After a decline in 2012-2014, homicides began to rise again in 2015 and jumped 20% in 2016. Official homicide statistics from Mexico's National Security System (SNSP) registered significant decreases in 2012 (about 5%), in 2013 (about 16%), and in 2014 (about 15%), before climbing upwards again in 2015 (+7%) and 2016 (+22%). SNSP reported the number of intentional homicides at 18,650 in 2015 to 22,932 in 2016. The worsening of security conditions over the past two years has been a major setback for President Enrique Pena Nieto (2012-2018), who pledged to reduce violence dramatically during his administration. - In 2016, increases in cases of intentional homicide were registered in 24 states. Fueling the national increase in homicides were increases in 24 states. Notably, the largest increases were registered in Colima with a 600% increase from 2015 to 2016, Nayarit (500% increase), and Zacatecas (405% increase), all of which have an important role in drug production or trafficking and are contested by rival organized crime groups. Meanwhile, several states registered noticeable decreases, including Queretaro with a 69% decrease in intentional homicides and Campeche with a 24% decrease. - Local officials and journalists remained prime targets of violence in 2016. According to Justice in Mexico's Memoria dataset, seven current or former mayors were killed in 2016 (in comparison five mayoral candidates, two sitting mayors, and one former mayor were killed in 2015). Justice in Mexico also documented 11 journalists and media-support workers killed in 2016 in Mexico, continuing a slight downward trend from the 14 killed in 2015 and 15 killed in 2014. - Mexico's recent violence is largely attributable to drug trafficking and organized crime. What is particularly concerning about Mexico's sudden increases in homicides in recent years is that much or most of this elevated violence appears to be attributable to "organized crime" groups, particularly those involved in drug trafficking. While there are important methodological problems with compiling data on organized crime-related killings, tallies produced over the past decade by government, media, academic, NGO, and consulting organizations suggest that roughly a third to half of all homicides in Mexico bear signs of organized crime-style violence, including the use of high-caliber automatic weapons, torture, dismemberment, and explicit messages involving organized crime groups. In 2016, there was greater disparity in the estimated number of organized crime-style killings documented by some sources (6,325 according to Reforma newspaper and 10,967 according to Milenio), but the proportion of total homicides was at least 25% and perhaps greater than 40%. - "El Chapo" Guzman's arrest and extradition appear to be partly fueling violence. The notorious kingpin leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzman, was arrested in early 2016. Guzman had been arrested previously in 2001, after which he escaped prison. He was then arrested in 2014, only to escape again in 2015. After the most recent arrest, demands for Guzman's extradition to the United States where he would face a 17- count indictment came to fruition. In early 2017, Guzman arrived in New York to face charges of organized crime, murder, and drug trafficking, among others. The analysis in this report suggests that a significant portion of Mexico's increases in violence in 2015 and 2016 were related to inter- and intra-organizational conflicts among rival drug traffickers in the wake of Guzman's re-arrest in 2016. - Constitutional deadline for New Criminal Justice System implementation passes. The New Criminal Justice System (NJSP) is in full effect nationwide, with the constitutional deadline for all 32 states to launch the system having passed on June 18, 2016. The justice system's overhaul from the traditional 'mixed inquisitorial' model of criminal procedure to an 'adversarial' model is significant step toward strengthening Mexico's democracy. However, many recognize that substantial further efforts will be needed to bolster the rule of law. - President Pena Nieto's approval rating hits new low amid concerns about corruption. Despite some important achievements, in 2016 President Peea Nieto (2012-2018) received the public's lowest approval rating not just for his first four years in office, but the lowest of all time for any president since Mexico began documenting approval ratings. In addition to accusations of corruption in his government and among fellow PRI politicians, Pena Nieto's unpopularity also reflects dissatisfaction with the country's recent economic and security problems, including the federal government's poor handling of the disappearance and murder of dozens of students from Ayotzinapa, Guerrero in 2014. - President Donald Trump prioritizes counter-narcotics efforts in Mexico. Drug trafficking from Mexico has become a more urgent concern in light of the mounting heroin epidemic in the United States, with the U.S. Center for Disease Control reporting that heroin-related deaths quadrupled to more than 8,200 people from 2002-2013. Initial diplomatic signals suggest that newly inaugurated U.S. President Donald Trump wants to push the Mexican government to reinvigorate its counter- narcotics efforts and also work to increase U.S. security measures along the 2,000 mile Southwest border. However, tensions between the two countries could undermine the close law enforcement and security cooperation achieved under the administrations of presidents George W. Bush (2000-2008) and Barack Obama (2008-2016). Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico, Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of San Diego, 2017. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 21, 2017 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2017_DrugViolenceinMexico.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2017_DrugViolenceinMexico.pdf Shelf Number: 145064 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related Violence (Mexico) Drugs and Crime Homicides Organized Crime Violent Crime |